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From Parameters, Autumn 1994, pp. 84-97
"We must realize that the projection of stability to Central and Eastern Europe is the most important
challenge facing the Euro-Atlantic community. We must develop a viable concept for meeting this
strategic challenge." -- German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe

Germany was perhaps the chief beneficiary of "the revolution of 1989." It achieved, in the process, its unification, the
withdrawal of foreign forces from its soil, and, concomitantly, the exercise of full sovereignty. Over the longer term,
this achievement may loom as large as the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Together, these two events also ensure that
relations between the new Germany and the new Russia will dominate the European security scene through the early
part of the next century. The key issue for both countries--indeed, for all of Europe--will be the security vacuum in
East Central Europe.
In order to understand better how this dynamic might play out, one must move beyond the current socioeconomic
trauma of unification and heretofore uncontrolled immigration that has mired Germany in recession, xenophobia, and
self-doubt. And one must move beyond the current alphabet soup of competing and overlapping European
organizations that, willy-nilly, may take a form as yet unanticipated. Doing so forces us--Germans and non-Germans
alike--to face the strategic reality that Germany is again a considerable economic power in the center of Europe and,
having regained full sovereignty for the first time in half a century, again a potentially assertive actor on the European
and world stages. Like it or not, planned or unplanned, we must face a new iteration of the eternal "German Question."
While there is a certain timelessness to that question, the chief lessons to be learned from history are that history never
repeats itself exactly and that great care must be used in drawing analogies from the past. It has been argued, for
example, that the current situation in Europe bears similarities to 1914. To be sure, there is revolution in Russia,
turmoil in the Balkans and a new central power in Germany. Unlike 1914, however, Franco-German enmity has been
replaced by a firm German anchor in the West. And to those who fear a return to 1933, there is not only that anchor in
the West but a half century of successful experience with democracy to provide assurance to the contrary. Simply put,
Bonn is not Weimar, and the Berlin Republic that is now emerging is not Bonn.[1]
The Berlin Republic will remain thoroughly democratic--the degree dependent on how it deals with its increasing
ethnic and cultural heterogeneity. And while firmly anchored in the West through strong ties with France, it will have
to pay considerable attention in the decade ahead to its security concerns in the East. A sober self-assessment of
interests and threats will push the "traditional" issues of the country's ties to Russia and the security vacuum in East
Central Europe to the forefront of the German security agenda. The German security perspective, therefore, will remain
Eurocentric and become increasingly eastward-looking rather than global. While the Berlin Republic will make its
weight felt in new ways on the global stage, especially through the United Nations, its concerns will differ from the
other major powers, save perhaps Japan. Questions remain, moreover, about whether Germany can--or even wants to-translate its economic power into military power. In many ways, Germany remains the reluctant power because of its
singularity.
The New Singularity
We are witnessing a return of Germany's traditional security problem--one dictated by its central position and its
dynamic economy. Try as it might, Germany cannot escape the consequences of its geographic position, its history, or

its economic prosperity. These factors contributed to German singularity, against which Helmut Schmidt and other
Germans railed, within the Cold War alliance. They contribute, too, to a new singularity--shared to a degree with
Japan--within the club of post-Cold War powers.
Even more than Japan, Germany has had to deal with the lingering consequences of World War II. While it has
perhaps dealt more directly than Japan with its wartime history, the uniqueness and magnitude of the Holocaust
still cause Germany's neighbors to treat any semblance of German unilateralism in military matters with great
suspicion. Then, too, the long period of division, occupation, and limited sovereignty accustomed German public
and politicians alike to being security consumers. The Bonn Republic was not interested in military
unilateralism.
For a variety of reasons, its geographic centrality on the Continent included, Germany has few ambitions or
concerns outside Europe. Save Hitler's short Reich and an equally short and unsuccessful pre-World War I foray
into Africa and the Pacific, Germany did not share the colonial experience that broadened the horizons of the
United States, Britain, and France. It therefore never developed the global interests or reach of those powers and,
until just the past few years, was never asked to shoulder a share of their global burdens. The NATO Alliance
and Bonn were content with Germany's preoccupation with defense of the homeland.
Nationalism still has a bad name within Germany. A heavy strain of pacifism and a healthy skepticism of
jingoistic patriotism translate into a reluctance to use politico-military power for the promotion of national
interests other than physical survival. This is a strange phenomenon, indeed, in the birthplace of Realpolitik, and
one that will be examined more closely below.
Again with the exception of Japan, Germany lacks the attributes of a great power--nuclear weapons and a seat
on the Security Council. Germany has begun an all-out effort to obtain the latter, as has Japan, but it is highly
unlikely that it would ever unilaterally seek the former. Key in this regard, however, is German confidence in the
American nuclear umbrella. Should that confidence fade, it is conceivable that Germany might seek a share of
French nuclear power or the development of a European deterrent.
Returning to geography, Germany seems cursed with being a front-line state. On both sides of the Cold War
front line, it finds itself again on the edge of Western Europe's political stability and economic prosperity facing
an East that lacks both. It is for this reason that Germany abhors the vacuum in East Central Europe far more
than the United States or its partners in the European Union. More than the other Western powers, it faces
specific and immediate threats to its east from nuclear proliferation and a potential flood of refugees.
As it faces these threats, Germany is very uncomfortable with its continued singularity. It appears determined to find
strength and cover in a new alliance that will push "Western Europe" as far eastward as possible, thus moving
Germany from the edge of a divided Continent to the center of a larger, more stable, and thus more comfortable
Europe. To do this, it needs the cooperation of its European Union partners, the United States and, yes, Russia. To
obtain that cooperation, it must convince those would-be partners in a larger Europe that it is itself a serious and
worthy partner willing to share the burdens of power. But getting in the way of such respect is a continued German
reluctance to take up the military tools of power--a reluctance that has its roots in post-World War II, Cold War
pacifism.
The Roots of Modern German Pacifism
The roots of modern German pacifism can be found in the experience of World War II and Nazi rule, with "Never
Again!" being the watchword of the 1950s anti-rearmament movement and, later, the anti-nuclear movement. This
pacifism spread quickly, by the late 1960s pervading large segments of the German body politic, particularly young
Germans. By that time, however, German pacifism had been transformed. It had become a cause, a movement that
young Germans could relate to by their own personal experience--the day-to-day experience of living at ground zero
of the Cold War. For much of the Cold War, it must have seemed to many Germans, including those in the West who
were truly thankful for their freedom and prosperity, that their aspirations again were being sacrificed on the altar of a
balance of power. This perception grew not only out of the physical division of the country but also out of the
psychological pain of living on the front line. Imagine living in an Oregon-sized country with more than 300,000
friendly but foreign soldiers and several thousand nuclear weapons. Is it any wonder that Germans:
Questioned the wisdom of some nuclear weapon systems, the range of which limited their use to German soil?

Placed greater stock in detente than we did?
Accepted pacifism as a political commonplace?
What is a wonder is that we, who now profess concern about German assertiveness, so recently viewed that pacifism
as dangerous.
By the time of the NATO "Double-Track" decision in 1979 and the collapse of the Schmidt government in 1982, there
had grown up in Germany a sizable body of opinion, not surprisingly strongest among young people, that professed
dissatisfaction with the status quo as it related to the division of Germany and to NATO's strategy of Flexible
Response. By 1982, for example, polls showed that a plurality of those under 30 preferred a neutral option. In essence,
a new generation of Germans, feeling no guilt for the past but saddled with its consequences, had begun a struggle to
redefine and rehabilitate the German nation. These young Germans were troubled not only by the past but by the
seemingly intractable problems represented by a hostile Soviet army occupying a large part of their nation and a
nuclear stalemate that seemingly froze the geopolitical status quo in Europe, threatening Germany with destruction to
preserve the peace.
With reunification and removal of the threat of immediate destruction, however, there is little to suggest, a decade
later, that the pacifism of the 1980s will survive the decade ahead. For it is a pacifism that is not religious or altruistic
but rather self-interested and nationalistic. During the Cold War it sought to protect Germans from destruction and
sought, at a political level, to keep open the option of unification through the practice of "divided detente."[2] Small
wonder that both the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) campaigned in 1983 under the motto: "In the German Interest." It is entirely conceivable that the next generation
of Germans, having achieved unification and having moved off nuclear ground zero, might redefine the "German
interest" of survival as one no longer requiring pacifism as a means to that vital end. Should that happen Germany
might no longer be the reluctant power.
Physical Constraints on German Power
In the meantime, Germany's power remains physically constrained by treaty-dictated limits on the Bundeswehr and
still somewhat constrained on using the Bundeswehr in out-of-area operations, since the recent court decision denying
that the constitution precluded such operations still requires a decision by the Bundestag for each proposed operation.
The peacetime size of the Bundeswehr is limited to 370,000 by the Two-Plus-Four Treaty; its full integration into the
NATO command structure and lack of a national centralized operational control structure greatly restrict its latitude
and capability for independent action in less-than-war operations. There appears to be little desire and limited
wherewithal to move beyond the Bundeswehr's current size limits. The reasons are economic and demographic.
Economically, Germany is facing the same pressures the United States is to achieve savings in the defense budget-savings that can be diverted to financing the rebuilding of eastern Germany. So far, the cuts in the defense budget have
been modest, but they are expected to grow: estimates for medium-term defense expenditures once in the range of 48
billion DM, were, until recently reduced, at roughly the same level they were a decade ago and about 10 percent less
than the 1990 high of 53.4 billion DM.[3]
Demographically, Germany's negative population growth, at least among ethnic German citizens, is contributing to a
downsizing of the Bundeswehr in two ways. Not only is the size of the pool of eligible manpower declining, but the
number of draft eligibles declaring themselves conscientious objectors has grown dramatically in recent years. These
conditions could lead to a stretching-out of active-duty requirements (unlikely, since required time of service has
recently been proposed as ten months rather than 12 months) or, despite protestations to the contrary by the country's
political leaders, the dropping of conscription in favor of an all-volunteer army. For all these reasons, the size of the
Bundeswehr could eventually drop below 300,000.[4]
Concerning the constitutional debate, it is hard to find anywhere in the German Constitution any explicit prohibition on
so-called out-of-area actions. Article 26 of the Constitution or Basic Law outlaws preparations for aggressive war and
acts that would "disturb the peaceful relations between nations," while Article 87 makes clear that German armed
forces may only be used for defensive purposes or, "apart from defense . . . only to the extent explicitly permitted by
the Basic Law." Article 24, however, allows Germany to enter "a system of mutual collective security" to ensure "the

maintenance of peace" and to "bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of
the world." In a long-running case before the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, the Kohl Government maintained that
this article, adopted after the founding of the United Nations but before the founding of NATO, permits participation in
UN-style peacekeeping operations outside the NATO area. Disagreeing, the opposition Social Democrats (SPD)
contended that the Basic Law must be amended to allow operations "apart from defense." In a 12 July 1994 decision,
the court sided with the government's position, thus clearing the way for out-of-area operations subject to a case-bycase majority vote in the Bundestag.
In the meantime, the CDU/CSU continues a nationwide educational effort designed to swing a still-reluctant public
behind a more permissive stance with regard to such operations. It has had some success in this effort, and even the
SPD has joined a consensus behind UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations. It remains to be seen, however, how far
the CDU/CSU can press such efforts in the midst of an election campaign and in the face of continued strong public
reluctance. It therefore appears likely that, in the near term, "Germany must face many of its current security
challenges without military means."[5] At the very least, it will face two nuclear-armed states to its east without
nuclear weapons of its own and with national conventional forces smaller than those of Russia or Ukraine. This is but
a part of Germany's "Eastern Problem."
Germany's Eastern Problem and Ours
Before tackling out-of-area tasks further afield, Germany must first come to grips with its Eastern Problem--a problem
precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the movement of Russian forces 800 miles
eastward. These circumstances have created a security vacuum in East Central Europe, leaving a weak Poland,
Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia between the still-limited power of Germany, with all the self-imposed and
other constraints that attach to it, and nuclear-armed Russia and Ukraine, both of which also have sizable conventional
forces. Complicating the problem is the contentious, unstable relationship between Russia and Ukraine.
This new situation creates a strategic dilemma for German planners who, in seeking to create stability and security on
their eastern borders, must overcome not only the constraints that attach to German power but also the concerns of
their Russian counterparts. For perhaps the first time in German history, however, they can approach this task with a
high degree of confidence about stability and security on their western borders. Indeed, it is Germany's firm anchor in
the West that gives it the prospect of success--again, perhaps for the first time in its history--in reaching a peaceful,
lasting solution to its Eastern Problem. In their approach to this problem, German planners must start with a clear
understanding of German interests.
German Interests
Increasingly, protection of interests--even in the eyes of realists--extends not only to the physical survival of a state's
people and the control of its territory and economic wherewithal but also to the survival of its ideals or values. This,
after all, is at the heart of the concept of the "polity." Therefore, the survival of Germany as a prosperous democracy
must be posited as the sine qua non in any pantheon of German interests. Defense of this interest is bolstered
immensely by Germany's membership in the strong community of shared values represented by the European Union
and NATO. It would presumably be further strengthened by spreading that community eastward by opening up the
membership of those two organizations or by strengthening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Therefore, for its values alone, it would seem that Germany has a vital interest in a broadened European integration
process.
But, when considering the physical survival of the people, one is immediately tossed back into that cauldron of
German culture and myth that surrounds the "concept of the nation" and that can fly in the face of democratic
universalism and confound the attempt to define the territory to be defended. There are two main problems that arise
from the German self-identity, tied up as it is with the racial and cultural criteria of Jus Sanquinis or "Law of the
Blood" as opposed to the territorial-based criteria of Jus Soli or "Law of the Place." First is the problem of internal
cohesion related to the inability or unwillingness of Germans to integrate the millions of newcomers who now consider
Germany their ultimate home. Just how serious this problem can become in terms of threatening the values of the
country is illustrated by the rise of xenophobia and right extremism over the past few years. Second is the international

problem arising from the presence of large pockets of ethnic Germans in the East.
Particularly troubling with regard to Germany's relations with the East are the nearly two million Germans living in
Russia, Poland, and Ukraine. For domestic political reasons, the German government has sought to encourage these
ethnic Germans to stay where they are. The principal means to this end have been agreements with the several
governments by which German economic aid is allowed to be targeted at the Germans within their borders. This
already has caused a degree of resentment among the majority populations of these countries and creates a source of
contention between Germany and its eastern neighbors. This could become a more acute problem if the ethnic
Germans in the East become more assertive or if more nationalist governments arise there, leading in turn to possible
persecution or expulsions. This is a touchy human rights issue with average Germans and is one that German
governments could ignore only at great political risk.[6]
Before considering the remaining element in the triad of German survival interests, there are two lower-level interests
worth mentioning. As a relatively small country, Germany is heavily dependent on exports for its domestic prosperity.
It therefore has an abiding major interest in broadening its markets and maintaining its competitiveness within those
markets. On this score, Germany appears fairly secure economically as the most powerful member of the European
Union and given a certain leveling of the trade playing field with the Asian-Pacific area in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. But, again, we see here the needs and limitations created by transnationalism. Germany needs to be
a member of these clubs and must submit to certain limitations on its freedom of action that grow out of that
membership.
Paradoxically, Germany seeks to broaden its freedom of action by pursuing a nebulous interest that Hans J.
Morgenthau would call "prestige." One contemporary observer puts it this way:
Today, important aspects of German security policy can be explained by its quest for equal status with the
other international powers. This objective has two dimensions. First, Germany wants to eliminate the
unique institutional and political restrictions made on its international role during the Cold War. Second, it
wants a standing that is commensurate with its new political and economic power.[7]
With regard to the first objective, throwing off the "unique institutional and political restrictions" of the Cold War, the
most important steps are the removal of the last Russian troops from eastern Germany in 1994 and playing a more
assertive role in NATO, similar to the role Germany now plays in the European Union. The venue for the second
aspect of this quest is the United Nations, where Germany now openly seeks Security Council membership. Certainly
such membership would give Germany a greater say over actions and events in East Central Europe and elsewhere that
affect German security. At question, however, is whether the German public is willing to accept the greater
responsibilities, principally in the peacekeeping area, that go with such membership. By the year 2000, Germany will
likely have achieved these "prestige" objectives and will, as a result, be a more "normal" country. Having achieved
such status, Germany might redefine its interests in more "normal," more nationalist terms, and, in any event, will
probably pursue its interests more assertively, less apologetically.
We can thus expect Germany to move more forcefully to protect the ultimate survival interest of any country, the third
element of the triad noted earlier--its territorial integrity. And it is important to stress in this regard that Germans today
mean the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic west of the Oder-Neisse. There are no expansionist claims that
would be supported by any more than a tiny minority of right extremists within the country. That is not to say
territorial issues might not come to the fore in the East despite the wishes of the German government and people. One
such issue might arise as a result of German investment in and ethnic German immigration (from elsewhere in Russia)
to Kaliningrad, the former East Prussian Koenigsberg, which now forms a heavily militarized Russian enclave on the
southern Baltic.[8]
The Correlation of Forces
Such esoterica aside, German planners have to consider the unfavorable correlation of forces on their eastern borders
in planning the defense of the homeland. That correlation is surely not in Germany's favor in terms of conventional
ground forces. Nor is it in Germany's favor when one considers the sizable nuclear arsenal that Russia still possesses,
not to mention the nuclear forces now at the command of Ukraine. To date, Germany has compensated for this

imbalance through NATO and the extended nuclear deterrence of the United States. The credibility and value of both
to Germany, however, could diminish rapidly. This has led some to speculate that Germany might at some point
reconsider its unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons. This does not appear to be a real possibility, however, at
least during the next decade. It would cause direct damage to Germany's other interests and intensify Germany's
security problem by giving rise to a harsh Russian reaction and to a rapid and perhaps final unraveling of Germany's
Westpolitik.
Far more likely and far wiser from a German point of view would be a redoubling of its efforts to keep the United
States engaged in Europe and to square that engagement with France's desire to strengthen the Franco-German core of
the nascent European security identity based on the Western European Union and European Union.[9] Greater security
in the defense of the homeland also will require getting the United States and Germany's other allies to acquiesce in
expanding NATO and the European Union to East Central Europe and decreasing the sources of instability in the area.
In this, Germany already has not only the acquiescence but the enthusiastic support of the Visigrad countries of East
Central Europe.[10]
But what of Germany's West European partners? While they share the interest of the Germans in stability in the East,
they do not share the intensity of that interest and therefore seem less inclined to invest in the East or to grant the
countries there preferential treatment within the European Union.[11] But, in the end, they may have to give a little on
this score to protect their far larger interest in keeping Germany a good team player in the European Union. They must
realize that if the European Union cannot help Germany with its problem in East Central Europe, Germany, for its part,
might lose interest in the union. If Germany were to go it alone, so, too, would the Bundesbank. Far better for France
and the other Europeans to have a German-dominated Eurobank, over which they have some say, than a de facto
Eurobank in the Bundesbank, over which they have no say.
On the security side of ledger, the French remain hesitant about a US-dominated NATO but increasingly inclined
toward finding a better modus vivendi with NATO as other anchors on Germany seem to be losing their hold.
Ironically, their preferred anchor--the Western European Union as the security arm of the European Union--probably
offers the best hope of calming the security fears of the East Central Europeans and Germans without arousing concern
in Russia. Much will depend on the attitudes of the Americans, attitudes that the Germans are probably best equipped
to influence. Like the Germans, the French also realize that given the ever-present possibility events in Russia could
turn sour on short notice, it would be prudent to ensure that the United States and NATO remain engaged until
alternative arrangements can be created.
Toward a New European Balance
Achieving a new, more enduring balance of power in East Central Europe will require identifying and dealing with the
commonalities and conflicts among the interests of the various players in the area and the relative strengths available
to each to protect and promote those interests. Given its stake in the outcome, Germany will play a particularly
important role in this process.
One common interest of all of Russia's western neighbors relates to ensuring that it develops along nonthreatening
democratic lines conducive to stability in the area and within Russia itself. To a large degree, this is an interest shared
by Russia and one that in no way runs counter to its real national interests--i.e., the economic welfare of its people and
the reduction of threats and instability on its borders. This entails greater Western economic assistance to Russia,
Ukraine, and the countries of East Central Europe.
Stability in East Central Europe and Russia is an interest felt most directly and most deeply by Germany, which as a
result is prone to move most forcefully to meet the economic and security needs of its eastern neighbors. Its survival
interests are so closely tied up with meeting those needs that Germany will do so unilaterally, if necessary. But all of
Germany's Western allies, especially France, share an interest with Germany in making such unilateralism
unnecessary. This, in turn, entails a need to proceed with the development of a common European foreign and security
policy and a more accepting attitude toward such a union.
The trade-offs involved are obvious. Not so obvious, however, is the popular will elsewhere--in the United States or

France--needed to make those trade-offs. Much will depend on whether the American people can be brought to
perceive a strong enough interest in East Central Europe to help Germany, Russia, and the countries of the area
decrease the security uncertainties that abound there. That perception does not now exist. Creation of a stable
European balance with regard to East Central Europe also will require changed attitudes and a degree of sacrifice on
the part of the French. They will have to accept a more rapid widening, a less rapid deepening of the European Union
to assuage the security anxieties of the Germans and East Central Europeans and must be prepared to work more
closely with the United States and NATO. And Europeans and Americans alike will have to find a way to factor in
legitimate Russian security concerns without giving Russia a veto over the pursuit of legitimate Western security
objectives.
Russia is not currently in a position to oppose directly the extension of Western security guarantees to East Central
Europe. It should benefit from decreased instability on its western borders and from moves to lock potentially volatile
governments there into more stable, more calculable security arrangements such as NATO. Far more troublesome from
a Russian point of view would be bilateral arrangements between Germany and the East Central European
governments. Such an outcome would be new, less calculable, and historically troubling. For the same historical
reasons as well as a desire to be a part of a "West" that includes Paris and Brussels, the former is also the choice of the
East Central Europeans. From a raw power point of view, however, they have little to say about the outcome.
For their part, the Germans also would prefer the multilateral Western approach. From a military power point of view,
they have neither the wherewithal nor the will to go it alone. To be militarily credible against the Russians, they need
the United States and their Western European allies. They realize, too, the political and economic costs that would be
involved in any attempt to go it alone. Also, powerful as Germany might be economically, the economic price of going
it alone would place intolerable burdens on German taxpayers and lead to unacceptable strains in the social fabric.
Politically, the price might include the end of the European integration process and the more "European Germany" of
Thomas Mann. Instead of leading to the integration of East Central Europe into Western Europe, such a course would
leave Germany in the historically uncomfortable position of being the primus inter parus in Central Europe surrounded
east and west by uneasy powers possessing nuclear weapons.
One such multilateral approach would be the Partnership for Peace, NATO's temporizing reply to the East Central
Europeans' increasingly insistent demand to be folded into West Europe in a security sense. In many ways, it is but a
warmed-over North Atlantic Cooperation Council (remember the NACC?), and East Central European leaders have
not been shy in expressing their disappointment with the tentative nature of the Partnership and their unhappiness at
the apparent deference being paid to Russia on this score. Recognizing that their leverage is weak, they are willing to
accept the Partnership as a first step in an evolutionary process. They can be expected, however, to continue to press
for a more binding commitment to full NATO membership, if the criteria set forth in the Partnership arrangement are
met. As Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski put it: "We are being asked to talk like a duck and walk like a duck.
When we finally convince NATO we are a duck, we do not want to be told that now they are looking for a goose."[12]
Conclusion
For a variety of reasons, however, NATO may not be the ideal or immediate means for pursuing such a multilateral
approach. First, the Russians have made it clear that they still consider NATO to be an "enemy" alliance that they do
not want extended to their doorstep. Second, France still considers NATO a tool for maintaining an American
leadership role in Europe. Third, the United States appears reluctant to extend its nuclear deterrent to the countries of
East Central Europe--an extension inherent in granting Article 5 NATO protection to those countries. One way around
these NATO hang-ups would be to use the Western European Union as a means for proffering a security blanket to the
East Central Europeans, a first, limited step being the 9 May 1994 granting of WEU "Associate Membership" to the
countries of the area. The advantages mirror NATO's disadvantages. First, the WEU has neither the American nuclear
arsenal nor the Cold War mantle of NATO and so should be less provocative to the Russians. Second, it is a European
organization that should appeal more to France. Third, use of the WEU, with its deepening links to the EU, would
complement eventual EU membership for the East Central Europeans, thus meeting an important German policy
objective. That leaves the Americans.
Such a course need not leave the Americans out--if the United States pursues a wise parallel course. First, prudence

demands that NATO and American ties to Europe through it not be disturbed during this delicate period of
reestablishing a balance in East Central Europe. Europeans should be the first to realize this, given the possibilities of
the rise of communo-fascist nationalism in Russia or conflict between that country and Ukraine. Second, continued,
increased American economic assistance is crucial to economic recovery and democratization in Russia and the
Commonwealth of Independent States. Finally, however, Americans must realize that as much as the Germans
continue to rely on us and, in particular, our nuclear weapons during this transitional phase toward a new order, a
"special relationship" is in neither party's interest. It would be far better for both to use our healthy bilateral
relationship to carry the more necessary, more productive multilateral Euro-Atlantic relationship into the future.
Allowing our European allies the slack to proceed toward a European solution to the vacuum in East Central Europe
may prove the ultimate test of American leadership over the next few years. It would buy us time to repair the
economic and social fabric of our own country. It also would give us time to reconsider our interests vis-à-vis Europe
and to reengage at some later point with renewed consensus and vigor. Finally, by forcing the Europeans to "do their
own thing," it could lead to the strengthening of a European pillar in an alliance in which burdens are more equitably
shared and, eventually, perhaps even a pan-European collective security system[13] that would involve both us and the
Russians. Such a system--the ultimate balance--would not only fill the current vacuum in East Central Europe but end
balance-of-power politics as we have known them on the Continent.
The achievement of such a European collective security system would contribute markedly to the possibility of a more
meaningful global collective security system. It would enable a more secure Germany to contribute more equitably to
the extra-European tasks inherent in the latter undertaking. It also would contribute to a solid building-block approach
to global collective security, putting into place one of several regional components of an eventual global edifice. To
the degree, moreover, that collective security can only work where--as in the Euro-Atlantic region--there are shared
interests and understandings, it is the only way to proceed.
NOTES
1. With apologies to Daniel S. Hamilton, who apparently was the first to use the term "Berlin Republic" to mean postunification Germany in his "Beyond Bonn: America and the Berlin Republic" (Report of the Carnegie Endowment
Study Group on Germany, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 1994). Labeling them by their
respective capitals is probably as useful a way of delineating periods of German republican history as is the numbering
of French republics for such French history.
2. "Divided detente" represented the German effort to insulate East-West German contacts from the ups and downs of
US-Soviet relations. It was an effort that both the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Bavarian Christian Social
Union (CSU) on the right and the Social Democrats (SPD) on the left supported with equal conviction. They both
viewed it as being in the German interest.
3. Survey on the Bundeswehr in Oesterreichische Militarische Zeitschrift, 2 (1993), 172. These cuts are even more
telling when one considers that a good portion of the current and upcoming budgets is expected to go for refurbishing
some east German facilities and safely destroying other such facilities and vast stocks of equipment (see Wolfgang F.
Schloer, "German Security Policy," Adelphi Paper 277 (1993), pp. 42 ff.).
4. The demographic pressures in this regard could be relieved somewhat by allowing in more ethnic Germans from
Poland, Hungary, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. There are more than three million such people in the
East.
5. Schloer, p. 52.
6. Of course, German politicians are not the only ones facing problems created by a large diaspora of ethnic kinsmen
abroad. Russia also has a major and perhaps vital interest in the protection of more than 25 million ethnic Russians
who found themselves stranded in Ukraine, the Baltic states, and elsewhere in the CIS after the breakup of the Soviet
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